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Epistemic permissivism (“EP”) is the view that, sometimes, it is possible 
for two people to rationally adopt different doxastic attitudes towards a 
proposition given the same body of evidence.  In other words, epistemic 
permissivists (“EPists”) maintain that it is possible for S to rationally 
believe that p, and S* to rationally believe that ~p, even though they both 
have the same evidence relevant to p.1  EPists thus deny rational uniqueness. 
UNIQUENESS is the view that there is one unique doxastic attitude a 
person may rationally take towards a proposition, given one’s total body 
of evidence.2  In cases where two people adopt opposing attitudes toward 
a proposition given the same body of evidence, UNIQUENESS claims at 
most one of their attitudes can be fully rational.
Numerous arguments have been advanced both for epistemic 
permissivism (Schoenﬁ eld, 2014; Brueckner and Bundy, 2012; Douven, 
2009; Rosen, 2006, 2001; van Fraassen, 2002) and against it (Matheson, 
2011; Sosa, 2010; Feldman, 2009, 2007; Christensen, 2010; White, 2005), 
but neither side seems convinced. This makes one wonder whether EP, as 
an epistemological thesis, is itself is a permissive case or whether one side 
is simply holding a view that is not rational.  Of course the answer to such 
a question will depend on which side of the debate one is on.  In this paper 
I argue that the question of whether the entire EP/ UNIQUENESS debate 
(hereafter, “EP debate”) is a permissive case – one where both sides are 
rationally holding opposing views – is a question that EPists must answer. 
I provide reasons to think that EPists should consider the EP debate to 
be a permissive case.  If I am right in this, however, then EPists have 
an internal tension in their view that defenders of UNIQUENESS do not 
have.  Namely, if EP itself is a permissive case, then EPists should not 
wish to argue that defenders of UNIQUENESS give up their views since 
they are rationally holding them. That is unless EPists are able to put forth 
some sort of new relevant evidence.
In Section I, I explore what it means to be a permissive case and argue 
that EPists should consider the EP debate to be a permissive one.  In section 
II, I lay out and defend an argument which shows that, if EPists do take 
the EP debate to be a permissive case, then unless they have new evidence 




UNIQUENESS to give up their views.  In Section III, I answer a possible 
objection to the argument laid out in Section II.
I. Is Permissivism Permissive?
Defenders of permissivism argue that two subjects may rationally adopt 
different doxastic attitudes towards a proposition because each subject 
may approach the same hypothesis with different, yet rational, sets of 
epistemic standards.  The differences in these standards mean that the 
same evidence may be interpreted (or weighed) in different ways.  Thus, 
EPists claim that EP may be one way to explain apparent cases of rational 
disagreement.  But EPists usually do not think that EP always holds true; it 
only holds true in permissive cases.  These so-called permissive cases are 
usually ones that involve a complex body of evidence.  A permissive case 
can be deﬁ ned as follows:
Permissive Case: a case in which S’s total evidence 
makes it rational to believe p and also makes it rational 
to believe ~p.
The question this paper raises is whether EP, as an epistemological thesis, 
should be considered a permissive case.  Of course, this question can only 
be meaningfully asked from an EPist’s point of view.  Since defenders of 
UNIQUENESS deny that there are permissive cases at all, they would also 
deny that the EP debate could be permissive.  But what should an EPist 
say about EP, considered as a hypothesis?  Is it permissive?  The answer 
has important implications for the view.  In what follows I will provide 
reasons to think that EPists should consider EP to be a permissive case. 
But before proceeding, let’s formulate this as a premise:
(1) EPists should think that EP itself is a permissive case.
In order for EP to be a permissive case, two conditions must hold.  First, it 
must be possible for disagreeing parties to have the same body of evidence 
E with respect to EP.  Second, it must be possible, given E, for one party to 
rationally believe EP and the other to rationally believe ~EP.3
Why suppose that the philosophers in this debate have the same 
body of evidence?  First, EPists deny that all or even most cases of 
disagreement should be attributed to subjects having differing bodies of 
evidence (See, for example, Rosen 2001:71; Schoenﬁ eld 2014: 196-197). 
Otherwise nearly all disagreement could be explained by way of appeal 
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to these differing evidential sets.  EPists presume that that permissive 
cases are fairly common and applicable to a wide range of subject matter. 
If permissive cases were extremely rare, EP as a theory would be much 
less interesting.  Example cases EPists take to be permissive include: jury 
members disagreeing over the guilt of a defendant (Schoenﬁ eld, 2014; 
Brueckner and Bundy, 2012; Rosen, 2001); paleontologists disagreeing 
over what killed the dinosaurs (Schoenﬁ eld, 2014; Rosen, 2001); and 
philosophers disagreeing over whether there is an analytic/synthetic 
distinction (Schoenﬁ eld, 2014).  In each of these cases, the evidential 
sets of jury members, paleontologists and philosophers are, respectively, 
presumed to be the same.  The disagreements that arise in these examples 
are thought to be because people are interpreting (or weighing) the same 
evidence using different sets of rational epistemic standards.  EPists deny 
that these disagreements should usually be attributed to subjects having 
different bodies of evidence.
What about the EP debate? This case presents strong similarities to 
the examples cited above.  Philosophers who disagree in the EP debate are 
well-informed and possess the same body of specialized knowledge.  They 
are aware of the evidence and arguments made for each view.  It seems, 
then, by parity of reasoning with respect to these other cases, EPists ought 
to think that philosophers engaged in this debate have the same body 
of evidence.4  Denying that defenders of UNIQUENESS have the same 
evidence would call into question EPists own assumptions regarding what 
counts as evidential differences in these other cases (which notably, are 
supposed to be evidence for EP!)  EPists therefore have reason not to 
restrict the notion of “having the same body of evidence” too narrowly.
If philosophers in this debate do have the same evidence, EPists 
must next ask whether it is possible to rationally interpret this evidence 
differently.  According to the spirit of their own view, the answer seems to 
be yes: it should be rational to accept UNIQUENESS. This conclusion is 
plausible because of the resemblance that the EP debate has to the other 
examples EPists presume to be permissive.  It would be strange for an 
EPist to think, given the spirit of their arguments, that entire groups of 
philosophers are being irrational in holding UNIQUENESS.  This would 
seem suspicious.  Of course there is nothing that logically prevents EPists 
from saying this, but then there is a burden of proof to show why the EP 
debate is so different.  
From the above considerations, EPists have good reason to consider 
the EP debate to be such that the disagreeing parties have the same 
evidence and yet rationally disagree.  There is reason for EPists to presume 




EPists therefore have good reason to think that EP itself is a permissive 
case.5
II. Tensions in the View
If the EP debate is permissive and UNIQUENESS is a rational view to hold, 
it should be understandable to EPists why defenders of UNIQUENESS 
reject EP and wish to argue against it.  From a UNIQUENESS theorist’s 
perspective, it is not permissible to believe EP; they see EP as an irrational 
position to hold.6  We can see this as follows:
(1) EPists should think that the EP debate itself is a permissive case.
(2) If the EP debate is a permissive case, then UNIQUENESS (~EP) 
is a rational epistemic standard.
(3) UNIQUENESS is therefore a rational epistemic standard. (modus 
ponens 1, 2) 
(4) If UNIQUENESS is a rational epistemic standard, then it is rational 
for defenders of UNIQUENESS to reject EP as an irrational view 
to hold.
By (3) and (4), it is clear why defenders of UNIQUENESS wish to 
convince EPists to give up their views.  They rationally believe EP is 
irrational.  However, things look different from the EPists’ perspective. 
There is an internal tension (or inconsistency) with their desire to convince 
defenders of UNIQUENESS to give up UNIQUENESS.  This can be seen 
as follows:
(5) EPists wish to argue that defenders of UNIQUENESS should give 
up UNIQUENESS.
(6) If an EPist wishes to argue that a defender of UNIQUENESS 
should give up UNIQUENESS, then an EPist should either
(i) point to some further evidence that makes it clear 
why UNIQUENSS is false,
or
(ii) show them that that UNIQUENESS is a non-rational 
epistemic standard.
(7) But if (i), then EPists should not think the EP debate itself is a 
permissive case. (contradiction 1, 6.i)
(8) And if (ii), then EPists should not think UNIQUENESS is a rational 
epistemic standard. (contradiction 3, 6.ii)
(9) Therefore, EPists should not rationally wish to argue that defenders 
of UNIQUENESS should give up UNIQUENESS. (reductio 1-8)
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This conclusion seems like an undesirable result for EPists.  Let’s 
examine premises (5)-(8) and see why one might accept them.  Premise 
(5) seems to be obvious.  Philosophers writing on the issue of EP claim 
that UNIQUENESS is false, and the fact that they are writing to convince 
others of its falsity suggests that they think defenders of UNIQUENESS 
should give up their view.  Premise (6) needs defense. It relies on an 
intuition of why a person should rationally want to convince someone 
else that a belief they hold is false.  The intuition is a norm of rational 
discourse, and it goes something like this. S should only want to attempt 
to convince S* of the falsity of her belief if S can provide reasons for 
why S*’s view is false.  If one cannot provide reasons for why a belief is 
false, then one should abstain from arguing.  Moreover, if reasons cannot 
be provided, then there seems to be no good rational reason to want to 
change the other’s view.   Even if I prefer my own view and think it is 
true, I should not rationally want to change another’s opinion if I cannot 
give them any reasons why their view is false.  Merely preferring my own 
view is not a sufﬁ cient ground to wish to convince another in the context 
of rational discourse.  A proper reason to wish to convince another may 
come in one of two forms, which are formulated in (6.i) and (6.ii) above. 
One’s interlocutors may not have considered all of the available evidence 
pertinent to the hypothesis in question, and this evidence might be provided 
as a reason for them to change their belief.  Or one’s interlocutors may be 
using epistemic standards that are not rational.  However, I have already 
argued that EPists should think each party in the debate possesses the same 
body of evidence and a rational set of epistemic standards.
The conclusion (9), then, shows that there is no proper reason for an 
EPist to wish to argue that non-EPists should give up UNIQUENESS. 
Both kinds of proper reasons (6.i and 6.ii) are blocked by what follows 
from (1).  As a permissive case, both parties may rationally disagree while 
sharing the same evidence.  This shows an internal tension in the EPist’s 
view.  It does not, however, show EP to be false.  Rather, it elucidates the 
fact that once the EPist perspective is adopted, there should come a point 
when EPists stop wanting to convince their opponents to give up their 
views.  It is difﬁ cult to say what point that is, however.  I presume it’s the 
point at which all of the available evidence for and against EP has been 
offered for consideration.  If one party becomes aware of new evidence, 
then by deﬁ nition EP is no longer a permissive case, and the disagreeing 
parties would not share E.  But if all the evidence is on the table, then a 






One might ask what it is that EPists take themselves to be doing when they 
argue for EP.  Perhaps one can reject the conclusion above by suggesting 
that EPists take themselves to be offering new evidence, in the form of 
arguments, for EP.  As long as EPists can offer new evidence for EP they 
might think that, at least temporarily, EP is not permissive.  After all, 
EPists believe that EP is true and UNIQUENESS is false.  Even if they 
acknowledge that UNIQUENESS is rational to believe, being an EPist 
doesn’t preclude one from searching for and offering new evidence to 
support one’s view.  Thus, an objector might say that as long as an EPist is 
offering new evidence for EP, then it is proper for them to want to convince 
defenders of UNIQUENESS that their view is false, by premise (6.i), and 
that premise (7) needs some kind of further qualiﬁ cation.
I do not think that this response eliminates the tension in the EPist’s 
position, for two reasons.  First, it has unacceptable implications for 
the “stability” of permissive cases.  According to the reasoning above, 
a hypothesis could become permissive and non-permissive within the 
context of a single conversation.  For example, take the case of two 
paleontologists, in the same department who have differing views about 
what killed the dinosaurs.  One day over lunch paleontologist A argues 
for his position with paleontologist B.  He might go about this in one of 
two ways.  If, for example, A brings to light some previously unknown 
archeological ﬁ nding relevant to the dinosaur’s extinction, it would be 
a clear case of offering further evidence.  Before A introduced the new 
evidence, the case would not be permissive (by deﬁ nition) because both 
A and B would not have shared the same evidence.  Knowing this, A 
would have a good reason to wish to argue.  But if A simply argues that 
B’s reasoning about the issue has been mistaken, then A is criticizing the 
rationality of B’s position.
The objection above suggests that this second way of arguing may 
itself be a way of introducing new evidence.  If that were true, then 
permissive cases would cease to become permissive every time two 
parties argued over them. The body of evidence would always be in ﬂ ux. 
Permissive cases would only be stable in silence.  If each individual 
discussion between disagreeing parties amounted to new evidence, then 
permissive cases would cease to be permissive each time there is a spoken 
disagreement. But this is not what EPists wish to argue.  It is very unlikely 
that any of us would ever have the same evidence if one includes every 
possible argument that could be used to interpret the evidence as evidence 
itself.
We can see, then, that EPists need to make a distinction between 
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evidence and arguments that interpret evidence.  Arguments that interpret 
evidence are the embodiment of a person’s epistemic standards; these 
arguments manifest those standards.  If EPists refused to make this kind of 
distinction, then most disagreements (in supposed permissive case) could 
be explained away by subjects simply having different evidential sets. 
The permissivist thesis would have very little application.7  That is not to 
say that all evidence must be empirical.  Necessary truths, proven axioms 
of mathematics, rules of logic, etc. could all serve as evidence for certain 
kinds of propositions. But arguments which are primarily interpretive of 
evidence are best conceived (from the EPist point of view) as embodying 
(or establishing) epistemic standards, not themselves as pieces of evidence. 
Otherwise permissive cases will be rare.
So what kind of evidence is there for EP?  EP is not supposed to be an 
a priori argument.8  The primary evidence for EP lies in the apparent cases 
of reasonable disagreement that we observe.  In those cases it seems (to 
EPists) that people have the same evidence and adopt different yet rational 
doxastic attitudes towards the evidence: cases involving juries, scientists, 
politicians, and philosophers.  Without such cases there would be no 
evidence for EP.  And if the distinction between evidence and arguments in 
the paragraph above holds, then EPists who argue that such cases should 
be interpreted as support for EP are in effect arguing against the rationality 
of the UNIQUENESS view.  They are arguing against the epistemic 
standards that defenders of UNIQUENESS use to interpret this same 
evidence.  Thus EPists are really adopting the UNIQUENESS perspective 
when they argue for their own view, even though it is inconsistent to do so.
IV. Conclusion
I have argued that EPists should consider the EP debate to be a permissive 
case.  As such, they should accept UNIQUENESS as an equally rational 
view, and they should not wish to convince defenders of UNIQUENESS 
to give up their views on the basis of its rationality.  If EPists want to be 
consistent and continue to argue for EP, then they need to bring forth new 
relevant evidence.  However, EPists must be careful what they qualify as 
“new evidence.”  If just any rational argument is considered to be new 
evidence, then there will be little reason to think that people share the same 
evidential sets in this and other purportedly permissive cases.  Very few 
people are in possession of all the same arguments and lines of reasoning, 
although they may be in possession of the same evidence.  If EPists admit 
in too many ways that people can have different evidence, then many of 
the purported examples of permissive cases will need to be thrown out. 




to be discovered.  Cases of apparent rational disagreement seem to be the 
only evidence available.  The arguments then turn on the most rational 
way to interpret that evidence.  If this is correct – and if EPists wish to 
take their own view seriously – then they probably should stop trying to 
convince defenders of UNIQUENESS to give up their views.
Notes
1 As Schoenﬁ eld (2014) emphasizes, this does not mean that there is one 
set of epistemic standards that would permit rational belief in p and ~p given the 
same evidence.  Rather, we must understand this possibility as the result of S and 
S* possessing different sets of epistemic standards, each of which are rational.
2 This unique attitude may be understood as belief, disbelief, and suspension 
of judgement (Feldman, 2007) or in terms of degrees of belief or subjective 
probabilities (White, 2005; Schoenﬁ eld, 2014; and others).  For the purposes of 
this paper I will assume Feldman’s tripartite model because the relation between 
outright belief and degrees of belief is controversial and would be distracting for 
the purposes of this paper.
3 Philosophers who defend UNIQUENESS deny this second possibility. 
UNIQUENESS theorists are committed to explaining the current disagreement 
over EP by saying either that (i) philosophers do not in fact have E with respect to 
EP, or that (ii) given E, EP is not a rational view to hold.
4 Of course the “permissiveness” of the case would need to be bounded in 
scope to include only those philosophers who are actually participating in the 
debate and to whom it would be reasonable to suppose have the same evidence. 
One might imagine this group to include those currently up to speed with the 
relevant literature.
5 I am assuming that EPists do think it is possible to know when one is in 
a permissive case. If from a ﬁ rst person perspective it is impossible to recognize 
when one is in a permissive case, then it would be impossible for EPists to 
recognize whether the EP debate is a permissive case.  But I take it that this is not 
what most EPists wish to argue. Recognition of permissive cases should not be 
limited to the third-person point of view.  However, this third-person point of view 
strategy has been offered as one way to get around certain objections posed to EP. 
See Brueckner and Bundy (2011).
6 This can be seen in the kinds of arguments defenders of UNIQUENESS 
make against EP.  Their arguments focus on the proper or rational way to think 
about evidence generally (for example, Sosa, Feldman, and Matheson) and/or the 
non-rational entailments of EP (a.k.a White’s “arbitrariness objection”).
7 This importance of making this distinction can also be seen in the case 
of jury outcomes.  Imagine eight jury members who have all heard the court’s 
evidence and deliberated.  They individually write their votes on a piece of paper. 
Now, if it turns out that half of the jury members vote guilty and the other half 
not-guilty, there is a stalemate.  Assuming EP is true, it is reasonable to think that 
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verdicts of both guilty and not-guilty can be arrived at rationally.  (Especially 
since the vote is split.  If the vote were 7-1, we might suspect that one person’s 
decision was perhaps irrational.)  All jury members have the same evidence. 
At this point, an EPist should not wish to convince her fellow jury members to 
change their vote.  To make further arguments would not be to offer new evidence; 
rather, it would be to challenge the rationality of those who interpret the evidence 
in a way differently from one’s own interpretation.  But only a defender of 
UNIQUENESS can be consistent with her view and wish to convince the others 
that they are seeing the evidence incorrectly.  Only a defender of UNIQUENESS 
can consistently maintain that disagreeing jury members have incorrectly applied 
epistemic standards (or used irrational ones) and maintain that there is only one 
rational way to respond to the court’s evidence.
8 It does not seem the EP hypothesis could be established a priori.  Most 
people in isolation would not, after carefully considering the evidence, reason to p 
and then think that ~p is equally rational.  People only operate within their own set 
of epistemic standards. The recognition of the possibility of EP (if there is such) 
can come only after inferring the EP hypothesis from apparent cases of rational 
disagreement.
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